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Abstract
It has been well documented that trade adjustment costs to workers due to global-
ization are significant and that temporary trade barriers have been progressively used in
many countries, especially during periods with high unemployment rates. Consequently,
temporary trade barriers are perceived as a feasible policy instrument for securing domes-
tic jobs in the presence of increased globalization and economic downturns. However, no
study has assessed whether such temporary barriers have actually saved domestic jobs. To
overcome this deficiency, we evaluate the China-specific safeguard case on consumer tires
petitioned by the United States. Contrary to claims made by the Obama administration,
we find that total employment and average wages in the tire industry were unaffected by
the safeguard using the ‘synthetic control’ approach proposed by Abadie et al. (2010). Fur-
ther analysis reveals that this result is not surprising as we find that imports from China
are completely diverted to other exporting countries partly due to the strong presence of
multinational corporations in the world tire market.
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“Over a thousand Americans are working today because we stopped a surge in Chinese
tires, but we need to do more.”
- President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address, Jan 24th, 2012.
“The tariffs didn’t have any material impact on our North American business.”
- Keith Price, a spokesman for Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Wall Street
Journal, Jan 20th, 2012.
1 Introduction
While trade barriers have reached historically low levels, a growing number of countries
are worried about job losses as a consequence of the trade liberalization. The concern is well
epitomized in the recent U.S. trade policy agenda. The Obama administration has filed trade
dispute cases with the World Trade Organization (WTO) at a pace twice as fast as that of the
previous administration. Moreover, the Interagency Trade Enforcement Center (ITEC) was
set up in February 2012 to monitor and investigate unfair trade practices.1 During the 2012
presidential election, both candidates pledged to take even stronger actions to protect U.S.
businesses and workers.2
The incentives to secure jobs by raising trade barriers are well explained in the literature.
Political economy of trade policy theory explains that higher risk of unemployment makes in-
dividuals more protectionist, which induces them to demand more protection through voting
or union lobbying activity. The politicians who seek re-election then protect industries with
high unemployment rates (Wallerstein, 1987; Bradford, 2006; Matschke and Sherlund, 2006;
Yotov, 2012). In addition to political economy considerations, there are other models that jus-
tify protectionism. Costinot (2009) derives a model where the aggregate welfare can improve
when highly unemployed industries are protected. Davidson et al. (2012) emphasize fairness
or altruistic concern toward displaced workers as another incentive for protection. Bagwell
and Staiger (2003) argue that trade policies are preferred to domestic redistributive policies
because they beggar thy neighbor: While domestic policies come at the expense of domestic
residents, trade policies cost foreigners.
Surprisingly, however, the literature so far has ignored to check whether such protective
trade policies can actually save domestic jobs. In fact, studies have only focused on the other
1See Rapoza (2012, January 25th) Forbes.
2In fact, ever-increasing imports from China were discussed as one of the greatest future threats to the national
security of the U.S. in the debates for the 2012 presidential election.
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direction, i.e., how trade liberalization affects employment or wages. Gaston and Trefler (1994)
and Trefler (2004), for example, find that import competition due to tariff declines have neg-
ative effects on wages in the U.S. and employment in Canada. In recent studies, Autor et
al. (2013a,b) estimate how much the import surge from China costs U.S. manufacturing em-
ployees, and find that the greater import competition causes higher unemployment, lower
wages, less labor market participation, and greater chance of switching jobs and receiving
government transfers. Roughly speaking, these costs account for one quarter of the aggregate
decline in U.S. manufacturing employment. McLaren and Hakobyan (2012) also find a signif-
icant adverse effect of import exposure to Mexico on U.S. wage growth for blue-color workers
after the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).3
The evidences above seem to imply that re-imposing trade barriers would secure domestic
jobs. However, most recent protection policies are enacted in the form of antidumping, coun-
tervailing duties, or safeguards, which are systematically different in their nature from the
trade barriers such as Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) tariff rates and import quotas that have
been lowered in recent decades. These policies, often collectively called temporary trade bar-
riers (TTBs), are typically (i) contingent, (ii) temporary, and (iii) discriminatory in that duties
are imposed for a limited time to a small set of products from particular countries.4 Due to
these characteristics, there are at least two channels that may divert trade flows and weaken
the impact of a TTB on domestic markets. First, the temporary feature of TTBs leaves a room
for targeted exporting firms to adjust their sales timing to either before or after the tariff inter-
vention. Second, perhaps more importantly, the discriminatory feature can divert the import
of subject products from the targeted country to other exporting countries. Thus, whether –
and the degree to which – a TTB can secure domestic jobs remains an unanswered empirical
question.
Despite the lack of empirical evidence, many WTO member countries have already been
opting for TTBs, especially in domestic recession phases with high unemployment rates. Knet-
ter and Prusa (2003) link antidumping filings with domestic real GDP growth to find their
counter-cyclical relationship during 1980-1998 in the U.S., Canada, Australia, and the Euro-
pean Union. Irwin (2005) extends a similar analysis to the period covering 1947-2002 in the
U.S. case, and finds that the unemployment rate is an important determinant of antidump-
ing investigations. More recently, two companion studies by Bown and Crowley (2012, 2013)
investigate thirteen emerging and five industrialized economies, respectively, and report evi-
dence that a high unemployment rate is associated with more TTB incidents.
This paper aims to fill up the deficiency in the literature by evaluating a special safeguard
3Similar patterns are observed in developing countries, too. See Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) for Columbia,
Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011) and Kovak (2013) for Brazil, Topalova (2010) for India.
4An exception to discriminatory feature is Global safeguard measure, since it is imposed to all countries.
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case on Chinese tires (China Tire Safeguard or CTS, henceforth) that has received a great deal
of public attention among recent TTB cases.5 Under Section 421 China-specific safeguard,
the U.S. imposed higher tariffs on certain Chinese passenger vehicle and light-truck tires for
three years from the fourth quarter of 2009 to the third quarter of 2012. The safeguard duties
were 35% ad valorem in the first year, 30% in the second, and 25% in the third on top of the
MFN duty rates.6 The case has triggered not only Chinese retaliation on U.S. poultry and
automotive parts, but also a serious controversy on the actual effectiveness of the CTS for the
U.S. tire industry.7 Despite such controversy, the CTS has been cited as a paragon of successful
trade policy for job security during the 2012 U.S. presidential campaign by both candidates.
The CTS provides a uniquely advantageous setting for answering the question of this pa-
per. While the CTS is representative in that it bears all three TTB characteristics described
above, one important distinction of the CTS is that the safeguard duties are exogenously de-
termined. In antidumping cases, which are the most pervasive form of TTB, duties are en-
dogenously determined to offset the dumping margin. Even after the duties are in place, they
are recalculated over time to adjust the dumping behavior changes of exporting firms.8 These
endogenous tariff changes complicate the evaluation of a tariff imposition effect. Secondly,
the change in the total import of subject Chinese tires before and after the safeguard initiation
is considerably large in both levels and growth rates.9 If TTBs have labor market outcomes,
this dramatic change should allow us to observe it. Third, contrary to most trade disputes in
which the producers filed a claim, the petition for the CTS was filed by the union representing
employees. This implies that the petition is indeed intended for employees’ benefits and thus
labor market effects.10
Estimating the impact of the China Tire Safeguard brings some challenges that need to be
addressed. Above all, the estimates may be confounded by macroeconomic trends. Since the
U.S. economy has been in recovery after the great recession of 2008-09, one may capture a spu-
riously inflated labor market effects that would have occurred even without tariff changes. A
typical identification strategy in this case is to compare the tire industry with similar industries
who have not experienced tariff changes. However, there is no clear criterion for choosing ap-
propriate control industries in our case. To circumvent this problem, we exploit the synthetic
control method (SCM) designed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010).
5Prusa (2011, P. 55) describes the China Tire Safeguard as “one of the most widely publicized temporary trade
barriers during 2005–9, garnering significant press attention both in the USA and in China.”
6MFN duty rates are 4% for radial (or radial-ply) tires and 3.4% for other type (bias-ply) of tires.
7See also Bussey (2012, January 20th) in Wall Street Journal.
8This recalculation process is also called administrative review process. Many studies investigate the implica-
tion of the review process on exporting firm’s pricing behavior. See, for example, Blonigen and Haynes (2002) and
Blonigen and Park (2004).
9Detail statistics are provided in Section 3.
10Prusa (2011) argues that the last two features are the main reasons of receiving unusual public attention.
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The core strategy of the SCM is to construct a “synthetic” industry by optimally weighting a
group of potential controls so that its outcome resembles the outcome of the tire industry as
close as possible during the pre-intervention period. Hence, the synthetic industry will mimic
the counterfactual tire industry for the post-intervention period as well in the absence of the
safeguard measuring.
The SCM estimates provide a striking result. Contrary to the Obama administration’s claim
that the safeguard measures had a positive effect on the labor market (see quote above), we
find that total employment and wages in the tire industry show no different time trends from
those in the synthetic industries. Our result is supported by another finding that the substan-
tial drop in Chinese tire imports is completely offset by the increase in imports from other
countries. This complete import diversion leaves little room for domestic producers to make
an adjustment in their production, which in turn induces no change in the labor market. Thus,
our study highlights that the discriminatory feature of TTB plays a crucial role for the negligi-
ble labor market effect.
To our best knowledge, there is no study that investigates the effect of a TTB on domestic
labor market outcomes. Some papers have looked at the exporting firms’ strategic responses
to a TTB through price adjustments (Blonigen and Haynes, 2002; Blonigen and Park, 2004),
quantity controls (Staiger and Wolak, 1992), or tariff-jumping investment (Blonigen, 2002;
Belderbos et al., 2004). These firm behaviors alter the aggregate trade patterns, and these
changes in trade patterns have been analyzed in the literature (Prusa, 1997; Brenton, 2001;
Bown and Crowley, 2007). Other studies have turned their attention to TTB effects on do-
mestic firms, with particular interests in output (Staiger and Wolak, 1994), markup (Konings
and Vandenbussche, 2005), profit (Kitano and Ohashi, 2009), and productivity (Konings and
Vandenbussche, 2008; Pierce, 2011).11 Although these studies may have some implications for
labor market outcomes, they are insufficient to draw definite conclusions on employment and
wage effects.
We begin our study with an overview of the China safeguard and the U.S. tire industry in
section 2. Section 3 describes data and time trends of Chinese tire imports and employment.
Section 4 provides the empirical model and discusses the results. Section 5 reports and dis-
cusses the results, and section 6 explores a potential mechanism that has driven our results.
Section 7 concludes with policy implications and the direction of future researches.
11These studies mostly deal only with antidumping cases. (Blonigen and Prusa, 2003) provide a comprehensive
survey on the literature of antidumping.
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2 Overview of China Safeguard and the U.S. Tire Industry
The U.S. Trade Act of 1974 describes conditions under which tariffs can be applied and
which groups can file a petition. Once the petition is filed, the International Trade Commis-
sion (USITC) makes a recommendation to the president. The president then makes a decision
whether to approve or veto the tariff. Two sections (Section 201 and 421) of the Trade Act
of 1974 deal with the use of safeguard tariffs. Under Section 201 (Global Safeguard), USITC
determines whether rising imports have been a substantial cause of “serious” injury, or threat
thereof, to a U.S. industry. On the other hand, Section 421 (China-specific Safeguard or China
Safeguard) applies only to China. China Safeguard was added by the U.S. as a condition to
China’s joining the WTO in 2001 and expired in 2013. Under Section 421, the USITC deter-
mines whether rising imports from China cause or threaten to cause a significant “material”
injury to the domestic industry. Total seven China Safeguard cases had been filed, of which
two were denied by the USITC and five were approved. Of these five approved cases, the
president ruled in favor of only one, which is the tire case.
There are a number of noteworthy differences regarding Global Safeguard vs. China Safe-
guard. First, the term “serious” vs. “material” implies a significant difference. Simply put,
China Safeguard can be applied under weaker conditions than Global Safeguard. For China
Safeguard to be applied, rising imports do not have to be the most important cause of injury to
the domestic industry, while this has to be the case for Global Safeguard. That is, the imports
from China need not be equal to or greater than any other cause. Second, China Safeguard is
discriminatory and allows MFN treatment to be violated.12
The U.S. tire industry has several characteristics to be considered for our analysis. First,
tire production is dominated by a few large multinational corporations (MNCs) in both the
U.S. and the world. As of 2008, ten firms produce the subject tires in the U.S., and eight of
them are MNCs.13 Production of the subject tires are so concentrated that five major MNCs
(Bridgestone, Continental, Cooper, Goodyear, and Michelin) control about 95% of domestic
production and 60% of worldwide production.14 Except Continental, Seven MNCs of the ten
domestic producers also have manufacturing facilities in China. Second, the subject tires are
known to feature three distinct classes, flagship (high quality), secondary (medium quality),
12There are three other primary areas under the WTO in which exceptions to MFN-treatment for import restric-
tions are broadly permissible: (1) raising discriminatory trade barriers against unfairly traded goods under an-
tidumping or countervailing duty laws; (2) lowering trade barriers in a discriminatory manner under a reciprocal
preferential trade agreement; and (3) lowering trade barriers in a discriminatory manner to developing countries
unilaterally, for example, under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). For an additional discussion of the
China safeguard, see Messerlin (2004) and Bown (2010).
13The ten U.S. subject tire producers are Bridgestone, Continental, Cooper, Denman, Goodyear, Michelin, Pirelli,
Specialty Tires, Toyo, and Yokohama. Eight firms except Denman and Specialty Tires are MNCs.
14Data source: Modern tire dealer (http://www.moderntiredealer.com/stats/default.aspx).
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and mass market (low quality). The domestic producers have largely shifted their focus to
higher-value tires since 1990s, leaving mass market tire productions to overseas manufactur-
ers.
These characteristics explain why the petition was not welcomed by the U.S. tire produc-
ers. The temporary tariff protection may actually hurt the MNCs’ global production strate-
gies. Moreover, the CTS would not have any positive influence to their domestic facilities that
mainly produce high and medium quality tires, given that those tires are not well substitutable
for low quality Chinese tires.15
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our data on quarterly imports from 1998Q1 to 2012Q3 are taken from the U.S. International
Trade Commission. Import data are available up to Harmonized System (HS) 10-digit, and
each 10-digit code is defined as a “product”. Import value is measured by customs value
that is exclusive of U.S. import duties, freight, insurance, and other charges. We also define
an “industry” as the 6-digit industry in the North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS). According to the definition, the tire industry is 326211, “Tire Manufacturing (except
Retreading)”, which comprises “establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing tires and
inner tubes from natural and synthetic rubber”. This corresponds to 62 tire-related products in
the HS 10-digit level (with heading 4006, 4011, 4012, and 4013) among which 10 tire products
are subject to the safeguard measures.
Data on employment and wages in U.S. tire industry covering the same time period are
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW).16 In
fact, Bureau of Labor Statistics provides two different industry-level employment databases,
the QCEW and the Current Employment Statistics (CES). We use the QCEW in this paper,
because it provides total employment and wages statistics for all 6-digit industries, while the
CES contains only part of them.17 For industry-level characteristics, we use data taken from
the Annual Survey of Manufactures.
Figure 1 plots time trends of the aggregate import value of the ten tire products subject to
the CTS as well as total employment in the U.S. tire industry from 1998Q1 to 2012Q3. The
import of Chinese tires starts to surge in 2001, just before China’s accession to the WTO. It
continues to grow dramatically until the activation of the CTS, except for a slight drop in
15Because of these characteristics of the U.S. tire industry, Prusa (2009) predicted that the effect of the CTS would
be negligible.
16While wages are reported on a quarterly basis, employment data are produced monthly. We construct quar-
terly employment data by simply averaging of the monthly data.
17Both databases have employment data in the tire industry. We checked the discrepancy between the two data,
but there was no systematic or significant difference.
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early 2009 due to the global financial crisis.18 Specifically, the import increases by 300 times
during ten years from $5.2 million dollars in 1999 to $1.56 billion dollars in 2008. In terms of
relative size, China alone accounts for a quarter of the U.S. total import of subject tires in 2008,
with tire imports from the rest of the world (ROW) at $4.80 billion dollars in the same year.
The value also amounts to 9.2% of gross value added of the U.S. tire industry in 2008, which
stood at $16.98 billion dollars.
The punitive tariffs substantially discourage the rising trend, reducing total imports from
China by 62% between 2009Q3 to 2009Q4. A sharp rise between Q2 and Q3 followed by the
sharp decline between Q3 and Q4 indicates that some importers in the U.S. bought the subject
Chinese tires in advance of the CTS to avoid the higher expected price after 2009Q3. After
2009Q4, tire imports from China are relatively flat, albeit at a much lower level compared to
pre-CTS levels.
Interestingly, the trend of employment in the U.S. tire industry stands in sharp contrast
to the trend of Chinese tire imports. It starts to fall when the Chinese tire imports start to
rise in 2001. In particular, the decline of employment in 2002Q1 coincides with China’s WTO
accession. Another falloff in 2006Q4 is caused by the strike in the U.S. tire industry and is not
relevant to the Chinese tire imports. In terms of growth, employment in the U.S. tire industry
falls by 30.5% from 2002Q1 to 2009Q3.19
The activation of the CTS seems to not only stop further decline in employment (with some
lags) but also prompt a slight recovery thereafter. As the Obama administration claims, total
employment increases from 45,855 in 2009Q3 to 46,812 in 2011Q4, an increase of about one
thousand workers. However, the employment trend around 2009 is obviously confounded by
the economic recovery from the global financial crisis, and thus the time-series data alone do
not allow us to identify the safeguard effect on employment in the U.S. tire industry.
4 Empirical Model
4.1 A Conceptual Framework
We conceptually sketch how domestic labor market can be affected by foreign competition
to propose an appropriate empirical model for identifying the safeguard effect. If the labor
market for an industry were competitive, domestic employment and wages would be simul-
18As Staiger and Wolak (1994) finds, subject tire imports may also fall because of the safeguard investigation
started from April in 2009.
19Note that, however, there are many other industries that suffered from more severe employment losses than
the tire industry over the same period. For example, we compare the employment growth rates of nine NAICS
6-digit industries in Table 2. The table shows that three out of nine industries have lower employment growth
rates than the tire industry has.
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taneously determined by its supply and demand elasticities. A change in foreign competition
works as a product demand shifter in this model. For example, an increase in import com-
petition would shrink the demand for domestic product and thereby decrease labor demand
while wages adjust to soften the degree to which the demand decreases through labor supply
elasticities (Freeman and Katz, 1991; Revenga, 1992).
In reality, however, industries in the U.S. are likely to face non-competitive labor market
for a number of reasons. One important reason is the presence of labor union through which
its members bargain with employers over terms and working conditions of employment. We
indeed observe such behavior in the tire industry being expressed as a strike in 2006. In
this case, the negotiated wage rate tends to be higher than the competitive rate and, in turn,
reduces the demand for labor, although their magnitudes can be heterogeneous across indus-
tries depending on workers’ bargaining power (Abowd and Lemieux, 1993; Revenga, 1997).
Non-competitive wages and employment can also be driven by other factors including effi-
ciency wages or factor immobility, but in any case the adjustment would arguably be made
in the same direction (i.e., higher wages and lower employment than the competitive equilib-
rium). The non-competitive market structure would also induce some rigidities in wages and
employment over time, because the terms and conditions of employment may hold at least
for a few years.
That said, we benchmark the empirical model by Revenga (1997) where non-competitive
wages are first negotiated between labor union and employers in the presence of foreign com-
petition and then firms choose their employment level according to their own labor demand
curves. More arguments are added to the model as necessary to explain some important fea-
tures in our context. Consider the following wage equation:




t + eit (1)
where wit is log of average weekly wages in industry i at time t. Firms that minimize their
production cost for given factor prices (other than wages) and output level would set their
wages at which marginal cost of labor equals marginal revenue product of labor. Hence, wit is
basically a function of output (qit), cost of capital (kit), and cost of materials (mit) which are all
taken logarithm. The level of industry foreign competition, a product demand shifter in this
model, is proxied by (log of) import penetration ratio, rit, which is equal to the ratio of import
to market size (= output + import - export).20
When the government intervenes in product markets by imposing punitive tariffs to cer-
tain imported goods, its impact on industry wages is supposed to be captured by the coef-
20The lagged wage rate can be added to the equation to explain the rigidity in wages.
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ficient γwit . Thus, Dit is a simple treatment assignment indicator that is one if industry i is
protected by the safeguard action at time t, and zero otherwise. Note that γwit varies fully over
time and across industries to give us a complete set of heterogeneous safeguard effects on
all industries in all post-intervention periods. The time-varying safeguard effect reflects the
declining schedule of the CTS by 5% annually, but it could also mean that the responses of
industries may come with some lags or simply be transitory.
Eq. (1) contains the term for unobservables (µwi λ
w
t ) as well as the error term (eit). The unob-
servables are made up of a vector of interactive fixed effects of which dimension is unknown,
and the whole term captures the effects of an unknown number of common factors (λwt ) with
heterogeneous factor loadings (µwi ) that may be jointly correlated with observables. This term
is more flexible to control for unobserved heterogeneity than the conventional configuration
of fixed effects.21 Indeed, we observe several economy-wide shocks in the sample period that
seems to have heterogeneous impacts on industry-level employment and wages across U.S.
industries. As an example, we have no rationale to assume that the financial crisis in 2008
would affect all industries by an equal magnitude. Similarly, not all industries would receive
an equal impact by the China’s accession to WTO in 2001 or its currency manipulation over
recent years. Perhaps, more relevantly, if wage bargaining is negotiated based on the “out-
side” or “alternative” wages available throughout the economy and different industries have
different bargaining powers, then the negotiated wages will also be different across industries.
All of these common factors and industry-specific factor loadings with their interactions may
cause the petitions for protection and subsequent government interventions, in which case
failing to control for such interactive effects would lead to biased estimates for γwit . We assume
that the error term is a white noise.
Once wages are set, firms now are assumed to choose employment level as much as they
demand for the given factor prices (including wages) and output level. The conditional labor
demand function can be estimated from the following equation:




t + υit . (2)
Log of employment, nit, in industry i at time t is conditional on wages as well as other
factor prices, output level, import penetration ratio, and the treatment assignment in a similar
fashion to Eq. (1).22 However, the structure of unobservables (µni λ
n
t ) in Eq. (2) can be different
from the one in Eq. (1) in terms of its dimension, since there might be some common factors
that affect employment but not wages and vice versa. The error term vit follows a white noise









, the vector of interactive fixed effects reduces to the conventional two
factors panel model with industry-specific effect and time effect.




A common approach to identify the treatment effect is the Difference-In-Differences (DID)
design. In a conventional DID model, the treatment (tire) industry is compared with some
control industries that have not experienced any trade policy change under the assumption
that the treatment industry would have followed the same trend as control industries had the
policy not changed. Therefore, the DID model requires a proper selection of a control group
to satisfy the common trend assumption.
In our case study, however, there is no clear criterion which industries should be chosen
as the control group. One choice may be a group of all manufacturing industries that filed
no petition (hence no protection) during the sample period, but those industries may be too
heterogeneous in their characteristics to have the same time trend in outcome variables. Alter-
natively, a group of manufacturing industries that did file petitions but failed to be accepted
can be considered in the sense that the group would face more or less similar circumstances to
the tire industry. Another possible control group consists of all industries (other than the tire
industry) under the same NAICS 3-digit code, i.e., 326 Plastics and Rubber Product Manufac-
turing since they are classified within the same 3-digit code based on the similarity of industry
characteristics. However, neither of these groups are convincing to satisfy the common trend
assumption.23
The Synthetic Control Method (SCM), designed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and
Abadie et al. (2010), is appealing to deal with the present problem. They provide a method
to generate a synthetic industry as the optimally weighted average over the outcomes of po-
tential control industries such that the average provides the best fit with the treatment in-
dustry’s outcome for the pre-intervention period. In other words, the SCM chooses the best
combination of any given control industries in the pre-intervention period to generate the
missing counterfactual of the treatment industry, so called synthetic industry, in the post-
intervention period, and thereby increases the likelihood of satisfying the common trend as-
sumption. Thus, the method is less demanding when it comes to choosing the "proper" set of
control industries.
There are two more big advantages to use the synthetic control method in our analysis.
First, the SCM can estimate the time-varying heterogeneous effect of the CTS, while a conven-
23Another problem in the conventional DID method occurs if the number of controls are small, since it leads
to an over-rejection of the null hypotheses of zero effect. Indeed, the suggested control groups above, except the
group of manufacturing industries that filed no petition, have less than twenty industries. According to Bertrand
et al. (2004), we need at least about 40 control industries (with one treatment industry) in order to avoid the over-
rejection problem.
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tional DID or panel fixed effect estimation can only provide an estimate for the time-invariant
average treatment effect. Second, it allows that the dimension of the vector of interactive
fixed effects is arbitrarily unknown. Given that unobservable (time-varying) macroeconomic
or (time-invariant) industry-specific factors have differential effects on each industry and they
are potentially related with the industry selection mechanism for trade remedies, this advan-
tage is important to obtain consistent estimates for the safeguard effect.
However, the SCM has a notable caveat. In order for the SCM to work, we need all ob-
servables to be time-invariant in the model, i.e., the estimation equations should look like the
following:






t + eit (3)






t + υit . (4)
where Xwi and X
n
i are the vectors of all observables in Eq. (1) and (2) that are restricted to be
constant over time. Thus, Xi’s should be interpreted as the pre-intervention industry charac-
teristics to predict the post-intervention values of outcome variables. Although this require-
ment may appear restrictive, the SCM can instead have any (or combination of) available pre-
intervention outcome variables in Xi, that is, Xi can include all values of dependent variables
in the pre-intervention period as predictors. These lagged values obviously explain the time
trend of dependent variables. Hence, they can account for rigidities in wages and employ-
ment in the pre-intervention period. Moreover, the problem of time-constant restriction on
predictors would be minimized to the extent which each lagged values represent the industry
characteristics at that period.
4.3 Implementation
Without loss of generality, let the tire industry be industry 1 among observable industries.









ω?i Xi = X1 . (5)
Here, the outcome and the vector of predictors, (yit, Xi), is either (wit, Xwi ) or (nit, X
n
i ) for
all i ∈ I. The Eq. (5) implies that we can obtain the exact solution for ω? only if ({y1t}t≤2009Q3, X1)
belongs to the convex hull of [({y2t}t≤2009Q3, X2), · · · , ({yIt}t≤2009Q3, XI)]. If it is not the case,
some weights have to be set negative to minimize the differences between variables in the left-
and right-hand sides in Eq. (5), but the fit may be poor. To avoid such extrapolation problem,
we choose all NAICS 6-digit manufacturing industries that filed no petition during the sample
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period as our potential control industries in the baseline analysis. This selection gives us 146
control industries.
Note that the optimal weight is obtained for the whole pre-intervention period. Abadie
et al. (2010) show that, for a sufficiently long pre-intervention period, the outcome of the
synthetic industry, ∑Ii=2 ω
?
i yit, provides an unbiased estimator of the counterfactual y1t for all
t.24 The estimated treatment effect on the tire industry is obtained by




ω?i yit, ∀t ≥ 2009Q4 (6)
where γˆ1t is for either wages or employment. Finally, we include the 2008 values of total
value of domestic shipments, cost of capital, cost of materials, and import penetration ratio
(additionally, wages for the employment equation) and each variable’s three year growth rate
from 2005 to 2008 as time-invariant pre-intervention characteristics. The sample period in
the baseline analysis ranges from 2001Q1 to 2012Q3, and all values of outcome variables in
this pre-intervention period could also be added in Xi’s as predictors. However, with only
a few selective values in the pre-intervention period, we can provide almost the same but
more efficient estimate for the treatment effect. Therefore, we choose eight lagged values of
employment and wages in 2001Q1, 2002Q2, 2003Q3, 2005Q1, 2006Q1, 2007Q3, 2008Q3, and
2009Q3 that are included in the estimation equations as additional predictors.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Main Finding
After the synthetic industries for employment and wages are constructed, their industry
characteristics and growth rates are compared to those of the tire industry as well as those of
simple averages of all control industries in Table 1. All numbers indicate that the two synthetic
industries are closer to the tire industry than the averages of all controls in both industry char-
acteristics and growth rates. In particular, the change in employment/wages from 2001Q1
to 2009Q3 are almost identical between tire and synthetic industry giving strong support for
the common trend assumption. At the same time, other industry characteristics of synthetic
industry are much more similar to tire industry than the simple average. Thus, if tire indus-
try had experienced the fundamental change in production structure such that technology or
capital replaced labor and labor-intensive products were offshored, our synthetic industry is
also likely to have such experiences. On the other hand, a conventional DID method would
24For more detail descriptions on estimation procedure and proofs, see Abadie et al. (2010).
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use the simple average of controls as the counterfactual tire industry, and the common trend
assumption is more likely to be violated.
Table 2 reports the list of control industries with strictly positive weights that construct the
two synthetic industries. Since employment and wages do not exhibit the same time trend,
we expect the optimal weights for each synthetic industry to differ, which turns out to be
true. This again supports the superiority of the synthetic industry approach over the equally
weighted average of 146 controls for both employment and wages.
Figure 2 compares the trends of employment and wages in the U.S. tire industry with those
of the synthetic industries. In general, the synthetic industries mimic employment and wage
trends of the tire industry quite well in the pre-intervention period. An exception is around
2006Q4 due to the strike in the U.S. tire industry. The Root Mean Squared Prediction Error
(RMSPE) shown at the bottom of each figure measures the sum of discrepancies between out-
comes in tire and in synthetic industries for the pre-intervention period. It will be used later as
a criterion for whether a synthetic industry is constructed well enough to mimic the treatment
industry. For the post-intervention period, we see no significant differences between the tire
industry and the synthetic industries for both employment and wages.
To infer the significance of the treatment effects formally, the SCM suggests a set of placebo
tests. A placebo test can be performed by choosing one of the control industries as the treated
industry and the other 145 industries as untreated industries. Specifically, we drop the tire
industry from the sample, and treat industry 2 as the treatment industry. Then, we follow the
same SCM procedure described above to obtain estimates of γˆ2t for t ≥ 2009Q4 using the rest
of industries 3 through 146 as control industries. This procedure is repeated for i = 3, · · · , 146.
Since all control industries are not protected during the sample period, their treatment effects,
γˆit for j = 2, · · · , 146, are expected to be zero. Hence, if the tire industry was affected by the
safeguard measures, we should be able to observe significantly different γˆ1t’s from all other
γˆit’s.
The results of two sets of placebo tests for employment and wages are displayed in Fig-
ure 3. Because some industries have poor synthetic industries with high RMSPEs, we show
the estimated treatment effects for industries whose RMSPE is less than 0.01 for employment
and 0.02 for wages. The vertical axis shows the estimated treatment effects of the tire and
placebo industries over the sample period. All of them are close to zero before the activation
of CTS, with exception of 2006Q4 in the case of the tire industry. In particular, the treatment
effects in the tire industry after the CTS are well bounded by other placebo treatment effects.
This confirms that neither employment nor wages in the tire industry are significantly affected
by the safeguard measures.
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5.2 Robustness
We first conduct a couple of robustness checks for our findings with the same SCM esti-
mation method. First of all, the results do not change when we drop the period of the tire
industry strike (i.e., 2006Q4) from our sample period. Secondly, we use alternative control
groups: (i) a group of 35 industries that filed a form of TTB at least once during the sample
period, but failed to be protected at all, and (ii) a group of 14 industries under NAICS 326
Rubber and Plastic Product Manufacturing that are free of any TTB case during the sample
period. The results do not change for both control groups. Finally, our findings still hold when
employment and wages are measured in levels instead of log transforms.25
Next step is to employ alternative estimation methods to check whether our SCM results
are robust to such different methods. First, we estimate the treatment effect using a traditional
DID method. Specifically, we run the following regression equation:
yit = δi + λt + Xitβ+ τDit + eit (7)
where yit is either employment or wages in log term and Xit is the vector of corresponding
covariates as in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2). δi and λt are industry and time fixed effects, respectively.
This model is a typical difference-in-differences specification that assigns an equal weight to
all control industries. The first column in Table 3 presents the estimation results. The sample
period ranges from 2007Q3 to 2011Q4 so that we have nine quarters before and after the CTS
activation in the sample.26 Thus, the sample size is 18 quarters times 147 industries including
the tire industry, which equals 2,646. The safeguard effect is shown to be negatively significant
for employment at the 1% level, while it has no significant effect on wages.
Eq. (7) is often called as a random growth model if we add the industry-specific linear
time trend of the dependent variable, ρit, in the equation. This specification is particularly
advantageous when the petition and the subsequent decision for the safeguard protection are
made because of the overall time trend of employment or wages. Technically speaking, it
allows industry-specific growth rates to be correlated with the treatment assignment, Dit, so
that we can avoid the selection bias problem as long as the selection is based on the growth
rates of the dependent variable. Estimation results are presented in the second column in
Table 3. Again, the CTS effect on domestic employment is negatively significant. On the other
hand, its impact on wages is now positive and significant even at the 1% significance level.
25We do not report results for the robustness checks to keep focusing on the main results. The results are
available upon request.
26The truncation in the pre-intervention period excludes the impact of the strike in the U.S. tire industry. The
truncation in the post-intervention period is simply due to the lack of data on industry characteristics in 2012. The
estimation results are qualitatively same when we extend the pre-intervention periods.
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The two estimations above are relying on the common trend assumption between the tire
industry and the rest of 146 control industries. Obviously, this assumption is too restrictive
for given heterogeneity across industries. To deal with the issue, we employ the Propensity
Score Matching method to select control industries comparable to the tire industry in the third
robustness check. Just like we matched industry characteristics in 2008 between the treatment
and control groups for the SCM case, here we match observables in 2008 (i.e., from 2008Q1 to
2008Q4) and choose 10 nearest neighbors to the tire industry with replacement, based on the
propensity scores.27 Then, we run the weighted regression on the controls with unobserved
heterogeneity and industry-specific linear time trend. Consequently, our sample size is as
large as 4,680. Column (3) in Table 3 indicates that the treatment effect is neither significant on
employment nor on wages.28
Fourth, we try to account for the cross-sectional dependence through common factors us-
ing the model developed by Pesaran (2006). The model specification is as follows:
yit = Xitβi + τiDit + µiλt + eit . (8)
Eq. (8) is closer to the original equations for wages and employment than Eq. (7), since it
allows the unknown vectors of industry- and time-specific unobserved effects to interact with
each other (µiλt). It also has an advantage that observable covariates can be time-varying,
compared to the SCM specification in Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) where the observables are time-
invariant. On the other hand, this model is less suitable than the SCM specification in the
sense that the coefficient τ should be time-constant to provide an average treatment effect
over the whole post-intervention period.
The intuition behind the estimation strategy in Pesaran (2006) is straightforward: To ac-
count for all biasing effects of the unobservable common factors (λt), the model includes the
cross-sectional averages of dependent and independent variables (i.e., y¯t and X¯t) as regressors
in a similar spirit to a panel correlated random effect model. Estimation then is separately per-
formed for each panel unit (i.e., each industry) so that the industry-specific unobserved effect
(µi) as well as the treatment effect (τi) can also be estimated by construction.29 We leave more
discussions on the estimation procedure to Pesaran (2006) and present the results in the fourth
column in Table 3. Clearly, we can see that there is no significant CTS effect, both statistically
and economically, on domestic employment and wages in the tire industry.
27The selected control industries in terms of NAICS code are 311611, 312130, 321219, 334210, and 336111 for the
employment equation and 322110, 324110, 327310, and 336111 for the wage equation.
28As mentioned earlier, small number of treatment and control industries may cause the over-rejection problem.
In our case, the null hypothesis is already rejected, but we still provide Wild bootstrap P-values suggested by
Cameron et al. (2008) to accurately test the statistical significance of estimates.
29Pesaran and Tosetti (2011) show that this estimated treatment effect is robust to the serial correlation in the
error term which is a desired feature in our case.
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As a final note, the industry that we analyzed (NAICS 326211) experienced more than one
policy change. While Passenger Car and Light Truck Tires under NAICS 326211 were subject
to China Safeguard from the 3rd quarter of 2009 for 3 years, Off-the-road Tires imported from
China were subject to anti-dumping (AD) duties from the 3rd quarter of 2008 that are still ef-
fective. Since our treatment group (NAICS 326211) is contaminated by the AD duties, ignoring
it might cast doubts on our empirical results. However, the domestic production of off-the-
road tires is less than 5% whereas that of passenger car and light truck tires is about 80% out
of the total production in the tire industry.30 Hence, even if AD duties might have affected
the employment and wages of the U.S. tire industry, its impacts would not be economically
significant. Moreover, if one looks at the employment and wages trend around 2008 in Figure
2, the AD duties do not seem to matter for the domestic employment and wages.31
6 Potential Mechanism
Our evidence regarding the CTS raises the question of why there is no effect. In this section,
we provide a potential mechanism through which the CTS had only a negligible impact on
employment and wages in the U.S. tire industry. Specifically, we focus on the discriminatory
nature of TTB as the key driving factor: Since the punitive tariff is imposed on a certain set
of products made in only one or few countries, imports may be diverted to other non-tariffed
countries who produce the same products. As Prusa (1997) argues, if this import diversion is
complete in the sense that the import decline from the target countries is offset by the import
increase from non-target countries, domestic producers have little room for any adjustment.32
In our case, we indeed find a complete import diversion in terms of import value as well
as volume (i.e., quantity). Obviously, however, not every TTB would produce the complete
diversion as in our case, and we need to understand what determines the degree to which
import is diverted. Although answering this question is beyond the scope of our study, we
provide some theoretical and anecdotal evidence that MNCs play an important role for the
30Authors calculate the ratio using disaggregated production data from 2008 Annual Survey of Manufacturers.
This ratio is similar to the report of Modern Tire Dealer in 2008. In terms of imports proportion, off-the-road tires
were only 9% out of total Chinese new tire imports in 2008, while passenger car and light truck tires are about
75%.
31In fact, we attempt to investigate passenger car tires only. While the employment and wages data on passenger
car tires are not available, the annual shipment data are available from Annual Survey of Manufacturers. We
calculate the annual ratio of passenger car tire production out of total tire production and multiply this ratio to
the employment data, assuming that the shipment ratio is proportional to the employment ratio. If there had been
a change in employment of passenger car tires manufacturing, the shipment must have been reflected. The SCM
results and traditional DID results using this weighted data produce the exactly same message: no impact of CTS
on domestic labor market. Estimation results are available upon request.
32Konings and Vandenbussche (2005) empirically support this argument by showing that domestic firms do
not change their mark-up when they experience a strong import diversion after their industry is protected by
antidumping action.
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complete diversion at the end of this section.
6.1 Trade Diversion
To formally assess how the total imports of subject tires from China and the RoW change
before and after the CTS, we again exploit a random growth model used in the previous sec-
tion. Subject tire imports were more rapidly increasing than the control tire imports both
in level and percentage change terms, and the safeguard measures are selectively applied to
some tire products based on the import growth rates. The random growth model deals with
this selection bias.
In our DID design for the tariff effect on subject tire imports, a natural control group would
comprise the other 52 tire-related products not subject to a tariff change. However, 13 tire
products out of 52 are subject to anti-dumping duties as noted in section 5.2. Also, some tire
products are either not imported for many years or highly volatile in their import volumes.
After dropping such products out of the control group, we have 33 control units versus 10
treatment units.33 Given these 43 tire-related products in our sample, clustering standard
errors at the product level is reasonably safe to avoid the over-rejection problem as discussed
in Bertrand et al. (2004) and Angrist and Pischke (2009). We also confine our sample period
from 2006Q4 to 2012Q3 so that three years before and after the treatment can be compared,
though extending the sample period does not change our results qualitatively.
In the model, the treatment effect, τj, is assumed heterogeneous across products but con-
stant over time. Let the import value (or volume) of product j at time t (from either China or
RoW), yjt, be given by
yjt = exp(δj + λt + ρjt+ τjDjt)ejt (9)
where δj and λt are product and time fixed effects, respectively, ρjt captures the product-
specific (linear) growth rate, and ejt is the idiosyncratic shock with zero mean. A typical
estimation approach is to transform Eq. (9) into log-linear form to obtain the fixed effect (FE)
estimator. However, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue that the log-linear transformation
can cause a bias due to heteroskedasticity or zero trade values, and suggest a Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator with the dependent variable in levels. Hence, we
follow the PPML estimation method, although the FE estimates are not qualitatively different.
Estimation results are provided in the first two columns in Table 4. Since we have some zero
trade values, the sample size is less than 1,032 (= 43×24). Panel A shows the average treatment
effect (ATE) on the subject Chinese tire imports, which is also called the trade destruction
effect by Bown and Crowley (2007). Trade destruction is both statistically and economically
33As emphasized in the main analysis, there is no clear criterion for selecting control unit. Our finding in this
section is at least robust to the extent which it include the volatile products in the control group.
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significant: The estimates show that safeguard measures reduced subject tire imports from
China by around 62% more than non-subject Chinese tire product imports in total value and
52% in quantity.
Panel B shows trade diversion effect by estimating the ATE on the subject tire import from
RoW. Trade diversion is also significant, with around a 17% increase in total value and a
38% increase in quantity. These increases are substantial, given that the total import value
of subject tires from the RoW in the pre-intervention period are, on average, three-times that
from China. To examine whether the trade diversion was actually complete, we estimate the
ATE on the total U.S. import (including China) of subject tires (see Panel C). Statistically and
economically insignificant estimates in Panel C imply that the total U.S. tire imports, whether
they are measured by value or volume, are not affected by the CTS. Thus, we find that trade
destruction is completely offset by trade diversion.
We look at how import unit values from China and the RoW change with the tariff in the
last column. As Trefler (2004) notes, changes in unit values within an HS 10 digit is likely
to reflect changes in prices. We use the same setup as Eq. (9) with import unit values as the
dependent variable instead. The unit value is defined as the ratio of customs value to total
quantity imported. Hence, it is the value prior to the import duty. The unit value of a tire
product from RoW is the weighted average of each country’s product unit value with its im-
port share being used as the weight. Panel A of the table estimates the ATE in unit values of
the subject Chinese tire products. The estimated effect is statistically insignificant. This im-
plies that the safeguard measures are mostly passed through which in turn is consistent with
the notion that the import destruction effect was substantial. Moreover, the estimation results
for the RoW case in Panel B are equally insignificant. These results together imply that the
reduction in tire imports from China is completely offset by a rise in RoW tire imports at the
pre-TTB unit price.
6.2 The Role of MNCs
The potential mechanism described above implies that the labor market effect of a TTB
would crucially depend on the degree to which an import diversion occurs. Although the
existing literature has not provided a rigorous explanation for the degree of diversion, we
can expect that factors such as the level of protection, industry structure, and substitutability
between foreign and domestic goods would affect the magnitude of import diversion. In the
CTS case, low substitutability between Chinese and domestic tires might stimulate the import
diversion from China to other countries who produce similar quality tires. Also, as Konings
et al. (2001) argue, high concentration of the subject tire market might increase the strategic
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rivalry which in turn offsets the effects of the safeguard measures.34
In our view, however, a more crucial reason for the ‘complete’ diversion is that the world
market for subject tire productions is dominated by MNCs. If there were no MNCs and the
tires were produced entirely by local exporters, trade diversion would induce the U.S. im-
porters to look for new exporters from other countries. Certainly, the frictions in replacing
trade partners make trade diversion costly. Not only that, even if trade partners are replaced,
the (new) local exporters might not be able to fully meet the domestic demand because of their
physical capacity constraints (Ahn and McQuoid, 2013; Blum et al., 2013) or credit constraints
(Chaney, 2013; Manova, 2013). On the other hand, MNCs who have multiple production facil-
ities across countries can substantially reduce such frictions, since they can not only reallocate
tire productions along their horizontal production chains to circumvent capacity constraint,
but also use internal capital markets linked with their parent firms to mobilize additional
funds in case of liquidity constraint. In fact, recent studies by Alfaro and Chen (2012) and
Manova et al. (2014) consistently find evidence that MNCs are more flexible to external shocks
and react better than local exporters by exploiting their production and financial linkages.
Due to the lack of adequate data, we cannot formally test the hypothesis that trade diver-
sion tends to be stronger in prevalence of MNCs. However, anecdotal evidence combined
with the U.S. import data corroborates our argument. Table 5 lists the top 10 subject tire ex-
porting countries to the U.S. in order of export percentage growth. All of these countries have
manufacturing facilities of the world’s major tire MNCs. For example, Thailand, the high-
est ranked country in the table, has production facilities of large MNCs such as Bridgestone,
Goodyear, Michelin, Sumitomo, and Yokohama. The Japanese business magazine, Nikkei, re-
ports that Thailand has become a key export base for these MNCs after the CTS activation.35
Indonesia has the subject tire plants of Bridgestone, Goodyear, and Sumitomo. Particularly,
Bridgestone in Indonesia has expanded its production capacity to meet increased demands in
2010.36
In terms of the dollar value of the net increase, it is South Korea who has benefited the most.
There are two major MNCs headquartered in South Korea (Hankook and Kumho) which also
have plants in China. These two MNCs shifted large shares of their productions from China
to South Korea and other countries to circumvent the safeguard measures. Especially, Han-
kook Tire Co., the biggest foreign tire producers in China and the world’s fastest-growing tire
company, clearly reports that “the [America] regional headquarters diversified production
34Konings et al. (2001, p. 294-5) discuss a couple of possible reasons why the import diversions in the European
Union are generally weaker than in the U.S. The reasons include lower duty level, lower market concentration,
higher uncertainty in decision making process, and more tariff-jumping FDI.
35Article source: http://www.thetruthaboutcars.com/2010/07/trade-war-watch-15-thai-tires-trump-chinese/.
The original article is available at http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASDD210AG_R20C10A7MM8000/
36Article source: http://www.bridgestone.com/corporate/news/2010051401.html
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sources to circumvent the additional 35 percent safeguard tariff on Chinese-made tires that
was imposed from the fourth quarter of 2009.” (Hankook Tire Annual Report 2010, p. 44).
In the case of Taiwan, Asia Times (2011, September 10th) reports that Bridgestone Taiwan,
which in the past did not export tires to the U.S., began to export one million tires to the U.S.
in 2009 in response to the tariff imposed on China. Furthermore, Cooper, headquartered in
Ohio, did not start sourcing tires from its U.S. plants to replace the Chinese imports. Instead,
the company switched to its partners in Taiwan and South Korea to supply the U.S. market.
These pieces of evidence altogether support that the discriminatory tariff induced MNCs to
switch productions from China to other countries.
Finally, it is noteworthy to compare our findings to another safeguard protection case, the
tariff on imports of heavyweight motorcycles from Japan between 1983 and 1987. This case
is often heralded as a great success of safeguard protection.37 While the nature of the Japan
safeguard is similar to the CTS in that it was temporary and discriminatory as well, there is a
major difference between them: The major motorcycle companies at the time were not MNCs.
Had Japanese or American (i.e., Harley-Davidson) firms been MNCs in the 80s with plants
outside the U.S. and Japan, our analysis suggests that the impact of the safeguard would have
been much weaker.
7 Concluding Remarks
Two branches in the trade literature independently document that trade adjustment costs
to workers due to the globalization are significant and that TTBs have been progressively used
across countries during periods of high unemployment rates. Our interpretation of these two
phenomena is that temporary trade barriers are perceived as a feasible policy instrument for
securing domestic jobs in the presence of increased globalization. Recent U.S. foreign trade
policies are also in line with our interpretation. Particularly, during the recent presidential
election in 2012, both candidates pledged stronger protection policies against China to save
domestic jobs while citing the China-specific safeguard case on consumer tires as a successful
example. This paper formally asks whether the CTS actually saved domestic jobs. Using the
synthetic control method to estimate the impact of the CTS, we find that the U.S. tire industry
experienced no gains in both employment and wages.
The negligible labor market effects are not surprising as further analysis reveals that im-
ports from China were completely diverted to other exporting countries leaving the U.S. pro-
duction unchanged. We also provide a potential reason for the complete import diversion.
37There is some controversy on whether the safeguard protection actually saved Harley-Davidson, the only
heavyweight motorcycles maker in the U.S. at the time, but the safeguard surely gave some breathing room to
Harley-Davidson on the brink of bankruptcy. See Feenstra (2004, Chapter 7) and Kitano and Ohashi (2009).
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Since the world tire industry is dominated by a small number of multinational corporations
with their own production and financial networks, the reallocation of production across coun-
tries is relatively frictionless. Since MNCs would diversify subject tire production to countries
who have a comparative advantage in producing similar quality tires, countries such as Thai-
land, Indonesia, South Korea, Mexico, and Taiwan became the predominant beneficiaries of
the discriminatory tariff policy, but not the U.S. Although we provide anecdotal evidence for
the crucial role that MNCs played in making the complete trade diversion possible, a more
systematic analysis with adequate data is left for future work.
Our study predicts that other TTBs that bear similar characteristics to the CTS should have
little impact on domestic labor markets in industries where MNCs are major players. This
prediction is particularly important given the remarkable trend in recent years toward the
proliferation of massively networked MNCs. Hence, negligible TTB effect should be more
pronounced in the future. Accordingly, an optimal trade policy design must take the presence
of MNCs into account.
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Table 1: Predictors of Employment and Wages
Employment Wages
Variables Tire Synthetic Averagea Tire Synthetic Averagea
∆Employment (n) / Wages (w) -0.517 -0.513 -0.285 0.106 0.100 0.173
Wages 6.978 6.707 6.919 – – –
∆Wages 0.106 0.169 0.172 – – –
Output (q) 8.307 8.385 7.616 8.307 7.545 7.616
∆Output 0.075 0.038 0.149 0.082 0.051 0.149
Cost of Capital (k) -2.910 -3.576 -3.734 -2.951 -3.449 -3.734
∆Cost of Capital 0.382 0.188 0.051 0.385 0.388 0.051
Cost of Material Inputs (m) -0.437 -0.522 -0.658 -0.395 -0.546 -0.658
∆ Cost of Material Inputs 0.171 0.045 0.031 0.180 0.177 0.031
Import Penetration Ratio (r) -2.017 -3.477 -3.516 -2.017 -2.304 -3.516
∆Import Penetration Ratio 0.091 0.028 -0.093 0.085 0.030 -0.093
aThe simple average of all potential control industries
Notes: All variables are log transformed. Growth rates for employment and wages are calculated as the %
change from 2001Q1 to 2009Q3. Output, cost of capital, cost of material inputs, and import penetration ratio
are 2008 values and each variable’s growth rate is the % change from 2005 to 2008. Eight lagged values of
employment (wages) included as predictors for the post-intervention employment (wages) are not reported
here to save space.
Table 2: 6-digit manufacturing industries
Employment Wages
NAICS Industry name Weight Growtha NAICS Industry name Weight Growtha
Treatment Industry
326211 Tire Manufacturing (Mfg) n/a -0.517 326211 Tire Manufacturing (Mfg) n/a 0.106
Control Industries
311213 Malt Mfg 0.009 -0.404 312111 Railroad Rolling Stock Mfg 0.046 0.123
311423 Dried and Dehydrated Food Mfg 0.016 -0.082 312130 Wineries 0.081 0.072
311611 Animal Slaughtering 0.391 -0.046 312140 Distilleries 0.081 0.312
313210 Broadwoven Fabric Mills 0.198 -1.373 321219 Reconstituted Wood Product Mfg 0.062 0.186
325120 Industrial Gas Mfg 0.158 -0.371 322110 Pulp Mills 0.047 0.221
333314 Optical Instrument and Lens Mfg 0.016 -0.286 324110 Petroleum Refineries 0.035 0.134
333515 Cutting Tool Mfg 0.094 -0.637 332992 Small Arms Ammunition Mfg 0.287 0.051
334412 Bare Printed Circuit Board Mfg 0.054 -1.300 334210 Telephone Apparatus Mfg 0.106 0.311
336510 Railroad Rolling Stock Mfg 0.065 -0.375 336330 Motor Vehicle Steering Mfg 0.252 -0.046
336992 Military Armored Vehicle Mfg 0.003 0.062
aGrowth rate is calculated as the average % change from 2001Q1 to 2009Q3.
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Table 3: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable Employment Wages Employment Wages Employment Wages Employment Wages
τˆ -0.048** -0.006 -0.029** 0.034** -0.026 0.033 -0.000 0.001
(0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.015) (0.021) (0.000) (0.001)
[.204] [.498]
Observations 2,646 2,646 2,646 2,646 4,680 4,680 2,646 2,646
R-squared 0.995 0.960 0.998 0.964 0.999 0.955 – –
Notes: The sample includes 147 industries with 18 quarter periods from 2007Q3 to 2011Q4. Robust standard errors for coefficients are
clustered at the industry level in parentheses, and Wild bootstrap P-values are additionally provided in the bracket. **significant at
1%; *significant 5%.
Table 4: Impact of the U.S. Tariffs on Tire Import Flows
Dep. Variable Import Value Quantity Unit Value
Panel A: Import from China
τˆ -0.962** -0.709** 0.126
(0.110) (0.242) (0.210)
% change -62.03 -52.23 10.95
Observations 1,032 1,032 847
R2 0.973 0.948 0.665
Panel B: Import from RoW
τˆ 0.157** 0.328** 0.008
(0.059) (0.105) (0.229)
% change 16.84 38.09 -1.80
Observations 1,032 1,032 1,026
R2 0.994 0.982 0.731
Panel C: Total Import
τˆ -0.082 0.007 0.201
(0.054) (0.151) (0.270)
% change -8.01 -0.44 17.85
Observations 1,032 1,032 1,027
R2 0.992 0.973 0.768
Notes: The sample includes 43 products with 24 quarter periods. All specifica-
tions include product-specific fixed effect and linear time trend, and time dum-
mies. Robust standard errors for coefficients are clustered at product level in
parentheses. Calculation of percentage changes are based on Kennedy (1981).
**significant at 1%.
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Table 5: Top 10 Subject Tire Exporting Countries to the U.S. by Export Percentage Growth
Country
Export to the U.S. (million $)
Net Increase % Growth
Before CTS After CTS
Thailand 418 1,457 1,038.58 248.33
Indonesia 489 1,220 731.08 149.53
Mexico 764 1,544 780.16 102.18
South Korea 1,941 3,876 1,935.49 99.73
U. K. 103 190 86.58 84.02
Taiwan 396 604 207.68 52.46
Germany 580 788 208.49 35.96
Canada 3,481 4,589 1,107.73 31.82
Costa Rica 256 327 70.92 27.72
Brazil 672 840 167.77 24.96
Notes: The total import volumes are calculated for 12 quarters before and after the
CTS activation ranging from 2006Q4 to 2012Q3. Countries with export greater
than hundred million dollars before the CTS activation are only listed.
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Figure 1: Trends of subject tire imports and the U.S. tire industry employment during 1998Q1-
2012Q3
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Figure 4: Trend in the U.S. Tire Import during 2001Q1-2012Q3
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